• Tag Archives insurance
  • The Real Reason State Farm Won’t Sell Home Insurance in California Anymore

    State Farm announced last week it will no longer accept homeowner insurance applications in California , where it has long been a leading insurance provider.

    In a press release , America’s largest property insurance company cited various reasons for its decision, including the high costs of doing business in California, macroeconomic factors such as inflation, and increased catastrophe exposure.

    Media seized on this last item to declare the official arrival of the climate apocalypse.

    “Climate shocks are making parts of America uninsurable,” The New York Times observed following State Farm’s announcement.

    While climate change might be in the zeitgeist, there are better explanations for State Farm’s exit.

    Though State Farm said nothing about climate change in its press release, there’s no question that California has struggled mightily with wildfires in recent years. Data collected by Policygenius show California experiences more wildfires than any other U.S. state (9,280 in 2021) and the most acreage burned (2.2 million acres).

    Worse, California’s wildfires tend to be the most destructive. The Golden State suffered $14 billion in insured wildfire losses in 2017, the most in history. The worst years for other states don’t even come close: The next closest is Texas, which suffered $530 million in insured wildfire losses in 2011, followed by Colorado ($450 million in 2012) and Arizona ($120 million in 2002).

    Many have seized on California’s struggles with wildfires to perpetuate the myth that wildfires are at historic highs in the United States—they are not—because of climate change. The truth is wildfires are not a serious problem in most parts of the U.S., and it’s not because the climate change gods are fickle, but because these states practice better land management.

    In a 2020 ProPublica article, journalist Elizabeth Weil pointed out that California officials have turned the state into a tinderbox through years of fire suppression.

    “The pattern is a form of insanity,” Weil wrote. “We keep doing overzealous fire suppression across California landscapes where the fire poses little risk to people and structures.”

    The New York Times noted California’s approach is a stark contrast to the Southeast, where “fire is widely accepted as a tool for land management” and millions of acres are allowed to burn each year.

    Property rights also play a role. In Texas, 95% of the land is privately owned , which has resulted in better stewardship and fewer megafires. This is a stark contrast to California, where roughly 48 million acres , nearly half the state’s land area, are owned by the federal government, which is so bad at land management that it managed to lose some 15 million acres of public land .

    The authorities have shown they are far less competent than the indigenous tribes who managed the land far more effectively through prescribed fire.

    “We should be empowering the people who know how to do this,” Crystal Kolden, a fire scientist at the University of California, Merced, told the New York Times after wildfires ravaged the state in 2020.

    Privatizing these lands would be more effective than any federal climate policy — ever hear of the tragedy of the commons ? — but government officials will never concede that their own mismanagement is to blame.

    “The factors driving State Farm’s decision are beyond our control, including climate change,” a statement from the California Department of Insurance said .

    It’s a tempting fiction to believe, to be sure. But the truth is California’s own policies are to blame, and not just fire suppression.

    I spoke to Rex Frazier, president of the Personal Insurance Federation of California, who cited several policies that no doubt contributed to State Farm’s decision to stop issuing policies, including various price controls that prevent insurers from raising prices to meet surging costs without the written approval of the California Department of Insurance.

    “California is the only state in the country that doesn’t allow insurers’ rates to be based upon actual reinsurance costs,” Frazier said. “California’s regulations employ a legal fiction that each insurer uses its own capital to serve customers. As reinsurance costs go up, insurers cannot have their rates reflect those higher costs.”

    Many will cling to the theory that climate change is the real culprit. Those who favor this theory should be asked why California is particularly prone to the externalities of climate change.

    This article originally appeared on The Washington Examiner.


    Jon Miltimore

    Jonathan Miltimore is the Managing Editor of FEE.org. (Follow him on Substack.)

    His writing/reporting has been the subject of articles in TIME magazine, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, Forbes, Fox News, and the Star Tribune.

    Bylines: Newsweek, The Washington Times, MSN.com, The Washington Examiner, The Daily Caller, The Federalist, the Epoch Times. 

    This article was originally published on FEE.org. Read the original article.


  • The US Rejected Obamacare in 1918

     

    The US rejected Obamacare in 1918. What a difference a mere hundred years makes! US voters rejected mandatory health insurance, or Obamacare, at the turn of the last century. It took supporters almost another century, but they finally won.

    For a quarter century before WWI, many of the nation’s young people went to Germany to complete their college education and returned determined to recreate the US in the image of socialist Germany. Richard Ely was one. He founded the American Economic Association for that sole purpose. He and economist Irving Fisher would lead the drive for universal, mandatory health care insurance.

    At the time, middle class and wealthier Americans paid a fee each time they visited a doctor. But the fees were too high for the working poor who instead organized into mutual aid societies to help each other with medical costs. Known as lodges, such as the Elks, or secret societies such the International Order of Odd Fellows (IOOF) or the Freemasons, or just fraternal organizations, mutual help societies existed for centuries. They followed the ancient guild practices of mutual aid to craft members. David T. Beito beautifully writes their history in his book From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State: Fraternal Societies and Social Services 1890-1967, published by the University of North Carolina Press in 2000.

    Socialists became wary of lodges, or fraternal societies, partly because of their secret passwords and handshakes. But the societies developed those for security purposes because they suffered from fraud by non-members wanting to cash in on the benefits. Two centuries ago an IOOF chapter in one state couldn’t easily contact another out-of-state chapter to confirm the membership of someone who wanted aid. The passwords and handshakes solved the problem.

    In the earliest day, the lodges offered burial insurance because poor people were terrified of suffering the indignities of a pauper’s burial. Later, they added healthcare and life insurance, built orphanages and hospitals, and provided pensions. The Shriners branch of the Freemasons still maintain children’s hospitals. Without the lodges, most members could not afford to pay fee-for-service doctors and would otherwise go without medical care. Readers who want to know how medical care should operate and what is wrong with today’s system should read Mr. Beito’s book.

    Medical Establishment Attack on Mutual Aid

    The medical establishment began attacking the lodges as early as the 1890s because the lodges would contract with doctors for a flat fee per year per member to provide medical care for lodge members. The practice, known as “capitation,” is making a comeback with the federal government as a means to restrain the explosive growth in the costs of medical care. Lodges usually contracted with doctors from private medical schools set up by other doctors to fill the deficiency in the supply of new doctors by the state schools.

    The American Medical Association (AMA) claimed that the lodges kept doctor pay too low, causing some to starve. So they launched public relations campaigns to stigmatize the lodge system and the doctors who served the working poor. They bribed politicians to shut down the medical schools they didn’t approve of, of course in the interest of “public health and safety” in the Baptists and Bootleggers style, in order to create a shortage of doctors. They bribed hospitals to reject doctors who worked with lodges and convinced medical organizations to ostracize them. AMA doctors refused to work at lodge-owned hospitals and the AMA worked tirelessly to shut those hospitals down. The AMA’s assault on “low pay” for their doctors finally worked,

    Lodge practice was also a victim of an overall shrinkage in the supply of physicians due to a relentless campaign of professional “birth control” imposed by the medical societies. In 1910, for example, the United States had 164 doctors per 100,000 people, compared with only 125 in 1930. This shift occurred in great part because of increasingly tight state certification requirements. Fewer doctors not only translated into higher medical fees but also weaker bargaining power for lodges. Meanwhile, the number of medical schools plummeted from a high of 166 in 1904 to 81 in 1922. The hardest hit were the proprietary schools, a prime recruiting avenue for lodges.

    When socialists and the AMA proposed mandatory health insurance for every citizen in the early 1900s, the lodges saw it as an attack on their system of self-reliance and mutual aid. Enough Americans shared the same values as the lodges that they defeated the proposals in two referenda. In 1918 the citizens of California voted three to one to reject mandatory health insurance. It failed again in New York in 1919.

    Abandoning Traditional Values

    But the times they were a-changing, and morality with it. Americans were abandoning traditional Christianity rapidly and its values of self-reliance and mutual aid. Of course, churches had always provided charity to the poorest since the early days of Christianity recorded in the Book of Acts in the Bible. But until the 1920s, Americans resisted accepting charity as much as they could out of a sense of honor. The lodges intended to help the working poor, not supplant charitable work. By the 1920s Americans interpreted self-reliance as selfishness. As Beito wrote,

    The traditional fraternal worldview was under attack. Age-old virtues such as mutual aid, character building, self-restraint, thrift, and self-help, once taken for granted, came under fire either as outmoded or as drastically in need of modification.

    In 1918 Clarence W. Tabor used his textbook, Business of the Household, to warn that if savings “means stunted lives, that is, physical derelicts or mental incompetents…through enforced self-denial and the absence of bodily comforts, or the starving of mental cravings and the sacrifice of spiritual development – then the price of increased bank deposits is too high.” An earlier generation would have dismissed these statements. Now they were in the mainstream. Bruce Barton, the public relations pioneer and author of the best-selling life of Christ, The Man Nobody Knows, espoused the ideal of self-realization rather than self-reliance, declaring that “life is meant to live and enjoy as you go along…. If self-denial is necessary I’ll practice some of it when I’m old and not try to do all of it now. For who knows? I may never be old.”

    JM Keynes echoed Barton in the 1930’s with his famous line, “In the long run we’re all dead,” and with his continual assault on the evils of the Protestant work ethic and savings. The ideal of “service” replaced that of self-reliance. By “service” socialists meant that the wealthy should give to the poor. They helped remove the stigma of charity by convincing the poor that they shouldn’t be ashamed of receiving aid because the wealthy owed it to them.

    The U.S. Became Increasingly Socialist

    In addition to the efforts of the AMA to destroy the excellent system of healthcare insurance set up by the fraternal societies, the progress of socialism continued to erode the appeal of self-help. For example, the federal government gave favorable tax treatment to corporations who offered group insurance without extending that to individuals while members of fraternal organizations received no tax deductions for their healthcare insurance.

    Corporations then paid the premiums so workers were fooled into thinking their insurance was free. Good economists understand that corporations merely deducted the premiums from future pay raises. The lodges argued that group insurance from the employer would enslave workers to a single company because they would lose their insurance if they lost their job whereas lodge insurance traveled with the individual. The lodges were right as we have found out.

    The Great Depression weakened lodges as the bulk of the 25% unemployment came from their ranks, the working poor. More assaults on mutual aid came with the passage of social security legislation, company pensions, and worker’s compensation insurance. Again, the government allowed corporations to deduct expenses for those from their taxes without extending the privilege to individuals in fraternal organizations. Then came Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s.

    The book exposes the lie that socialists proposed their welfare measures because they saw a desperate need for them. Churches and charities had provided for the poor who couldn’t work since Biblical times, while the fraternal societies took care of the working poor very well. In 1924, 48% of working-class adult males were lodge members.

    Socialists opposed the lodge system, not because it failed; it hadn’t. They opposed it because they wanted the services provided by the state as they were in Germany. They convinced the American people that socialism would not just help the poor, as the churches and fraternal organizations were, but would eliminate poverty. And as Helmut Schoeck warned us in his Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior, the lust to destroy successful people served as fuel for the fire. Beito’s concluding paragraph is worth reprinting in full:

    The shift from mutual aid and self-help to the welfare state has involved more than a simple bookkeeping transfer of service provision from one set of institutions to another. As many of the leaders of fraternal societies had feared, much was lost in an exchange that transcended monetary calculations. The old relationships of voluntary reciprocity and autonomy have slowly given way to paternalistic dependency. Instead of mutual aid, the dominant social welfare arrangements of Americans have increasingly become characterized by impersonal bureaucracies controlled by outsiders.


    Roger McKinney

    Roger D. McKinney works as an analyst for a tiny healthcare insurance agency in Tulsa and writes a blog about economics at rdmckinney.blogspot.com. He has an MA in economics from the University of Oklahoma and is author of the book Financial Bull Riding.

    This article was originally published on FEE.org. Read the original article.


  • Flood Subsidies Helped Harvey Do More Harm

     

    Hurricane Harvey, which battered Texas over the past week, offers the clearest lesson why Congress should not perpetuate the federal National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which expires at the end of September. The ravages in Houston and elsewhere would be far less if the federal government had not offered massively subsidized flood insurance in high risk, environmentally perilous locales. But this is the same folly that the feds have perpetuated for almost 50 years.

    Encouraging Risk and Losses

    Two years before NFIP was created, the 1966 Presidential Task Force on Federal Flood Control Policy warned that a badly run program “could exacerbate the whole problem of flood losses. For the Federal Government to subsidize low premium disaster insurance … would be to invite economic waste of great magnitude.” That sage advice was ignored.

    Instead, NFIP embraced a “flood-rebuild-repeat” model that has spawned an almost $25 billion debt. The National Wildlife Foundation estimated in 1998 that 2% of properties covered by federal flood insurance had multiple damage claims accounting for 40% of total flood insurance outlays, and that more than 5,000 homes had repeat claims exceeding their property value. A recent Pew Charitable Trust study revealed that 1% of the 5 million properties insured have produced almost a third of the damage claims and half the debt.

    NFIP paid to rebuild one Houston home 16 times in 18 years, spending almost a million dollars to perpetually restore a house worth less than $120,000. Harris County, Texas (which includes Houston), has almost 10,000 properties which have filed repetitive flood insurance damage claims. The Washington Post recently reported that a house “outside Baton Rouge, valued at $55,921, has flooded 40 times over the years, amassing $428,379 in claims. A $90,000 property near the Mississippi River north of St. Louis has flooded 34 times, racking up claims of more than $608,000.”

    When NFIP was created, one of its purported goals was to deter development in fragile areas such as coastal wetlands. However, as Steve Ellis of Taxpayers for Common Sense observed, “NFIP helped fuel the coastal development boom that increased the program’s risk exposure and losses.”

    The program’s anti-environmental impact has been denounced by organizations ranging from the Natural Resource Defense Council, Sierra Club, American Rivers, and the Coastal Alliance.

    Who Do These Subsidies Really Benefit?

    Rather than encouraging reasonable land use policies, NFIP subsidies help level the playing field between swampland and solid ground. For instance, Houston residents outside a too narrowly-drawn floodplain can receive $350,000 in insurance coverage for only $450 a year.

    But there is no reason for federal intervention to encourage building in every dubious nook and cranny across the land – or in areas such as the low-lying Texas Gulf coast repeatedly ravaged by bad storms.

    Controversies over environmental havoc and “repetitive loss” sinkholes finally spurred Congress to radically reform flood insurance five years ago, ending some of its worst abuses. But prudence proved unbearable on Capitol Hill. After homeowners wailed about higher insurance rates, Congress gutted most of the reforms two years later to prevent the program from charging fees to accurately reflect perils.

    Politicians insisted that the repeal was necessary to preserve “affordable” flood insurance. But nobody was conscripted to buy a vacation home in Hurricane Alley on the Atlantic Coast. Flood insurance subsidies benefit well-off households, and payouts disproportionately go to areas with much higher than average home values. Working stiffs in Idaho and Oklahoma are taxed to underwrite mansions for the elite.

    Distorting the Risks

    FEMA is relying on maps that are up to 40 years old to calculate flood risks in many areas. FEMA has loitered on updating in part because many members of Congress vehemently oppose accurate estimates of the risks and updated, higher insurance rates for their constituents.

    According to FEMA flood insurance specialist David Schein, “Grandfathering is a huge discount on the actuarial premium. We’re not charging them for the actual risk of flooding; we’re charging them for the risk it was before we mapped the flood zone.”

    FEMA mapping decisions are also open to finagling by well-connected landowners. NBC News revealed in 2014 that FEMA revised its flood maps to give 95%+ discounted insurance premiums to “hundreds of oceanfront condo buildings and million-dollar homes,” including properties on its “repetitive loss list.”

    FEMA, unlike private insurers, lacks incentives to acquire and analyze the complex data vital for setting rates for 5 million properties. The Government Accountability Office noted a few years ago that FEMA provided “direction on file cabinet sizes and the use of candles in file rooms but did not provide clear direction on electronic recordkeeping.” GAO did not disclose whether the candle guidelines were derived from Charles Dickens’ novels.

    Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-Tex.), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, is pushing a bill that would curtail some subsidies and allow more competition from private insurers. A competing bill championed by Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) would perpetuate current perverse incentives and, as the New Jersey Star Ledger warned, would be “almost certain to encourage more building in repeatedly flooded areas such as Mystic Island in Little Egg Harbor.”

    Debt Forgiveness Isn’t a Fix

    Some Democrats have pushed for Congress to “forgive” NFIP’s debt – the usual D.C. boondoggle “fix.” But both the GAO and the Congressional Budget Office concluded that NFIP will continue to be unsustainable even if past losses are expunged. The program’s third-highest ever claims payout was last year – despite the lack of a mega-disaster such as Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Sandy. Hurricane Harvey will add billions of dollars to NFIP’s debt (almost a quarter million homes in Harris County alone have flood insurance).

    The financial soundness of federal flood insurance will always depend on politicians’ self-restraint in buying votes. In other words, the program is actuarially doomed. There is no constitutional right to federal bailouts for flooded homes. The sooner the feds exit the flood insurance business, the safer American coasts and paychecks will be.

    Reprinted from USA Today.


    James Bovard

    James Bovard is the author of ten books, including Public Policy Hooligan, Attention Deficit Democracy, and Lost Rights: The Destruction of American Liberty. Find him on Twitter @JimBovard.

    This article was originally published on FEE.org. Read the original article.