Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site ubvax.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!bonnie!akgua!sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!hplabs!hpda!fortune!amdcad!cae780!ubvax!tonyw From: tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: freedom and reason (attn russ, rich, & laura) Message-ID: <150@ubvax.UUCP> Date: Mon, 1-Apr-85 15:49:14 EST Article-I.D.: ubvax.150 Posted: Mon Apr 1 15:49:14 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 7-Apr-85 04:55:32 EST References: <362@aesat.UUCP> <5272@utzoo.UUCP> <137@ubvax.UUCP> <861@wucs.UUCP> Organization: Ungermann-Bass, Inc., Santa Clara, CA Lines: 37 > In article <137@ubvax.UUCP> tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch) writes: > >Another funny assumption of this free will debate is that free will > >is a possession, some kind of {meta}physical capacity in us. That can't > >be! Free will is a *relation* between a person and her world (world: some > >bounded space-time continuum of possibility). The question "does man > >have free will" should be answered, "depends on who and where -- which > >man[persons] and what world[worlds]". > >Tony Wuersch > > Which person, yes, but which world, I'm not so sure. Couldn't the same > constitution of me (my body), subject to the same physical laws, exist > in a "world" in which many other things were different? It seems to me > that in any such world, "I" would have exactly the same amount of free > will as I do in the actual world. > > "ICONBUSTERS!" --President, ICONBUSTERS, > Paul V. Torek, wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 If I'm tied up in a chair and gagged in some other world, my constitution might be the same but I would lack free will. "Agency" implies a agent whom a world reacts to. It implies some means of control over the world; as Nozick said, "Just because determinism is true doesn't mean thermostats don't control temperature." If an agent is bound from reacting to the world in a manner meaningful and significant to the agent, then that agent lacks free will. Free will thus depends on the structure of the world. I'm not proposing mine as THE definition of free will; I don't think philosophy works that way. I am proposing it as a reasonable definition, one which helps us develop a sense of free will which we can use in our daily life to make our lives better and happier. ("Sense" as in 'sense and reference', please) As an Aristotelian naturalist, creating useful distinctions such as a pragmatic definition of free will is what I take to be the business of good philosophy. Tony Wuersch {amd,amdcad}!cae780!ubvax!tonyw