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From: fagin@ucbvax.ARPA (Barry Steven Fagin)
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Taking up Richard's gauntlet ...
Message-ID: <4715@ucbvax.ARPA>
Date: Sun, 10-Feb-85 15:16:21 EST
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.4715
Posted: Sun Feb 10 15:16:21 1985
Date-Received: Mon, 11-Feb-85 06:49:45 EST
References: <326@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP>
Reply-To: fagin@ucbvax.UUCP (Barry Steven Fagin)
Followup-To: net.politics.theory
Organization: University of California at Berkeley
Lines: 126
Summary: 

Richard Carnes would prefer libertarians to be more philosophically
precise.  Here is my humble attempt:

(regarding the definition of theft)
> Please refer to your favorite dictionary.  Therein you will find that theft
> is by definition "felonious," i.e., unlawful.  Taxation is by definition
> enforced by law.  Whether "taxation is theft" is merely a matter of
> *definition* and is not in itself a question of political philosophy.  

Definitions are crucial in philosophy, indeed in reasoning in
general.  They're the starting point for all productive philosophical
discussion.  Whether or not taxation is theft is indeed a matter of
definition, PROVIDED we accept your definition of theft.  Consider,
however, another definition:

	"Theft: the taking of justly obtained property from one or more
persons by one or more persons, in an unjust manner".

	This definition seems to me to be much more interesting, since
it contains the words "just" and "unjust" in it.  If we accept this
definition of theft, then whether or not taxation is theft becomes
a question of political philosophy, since in order to answer the question
we have to deal with justice and injustice.  I think this is a good definition
of theft, but if you refuse to accept it then it would be foolish for us
to proceed further until we have arrived at a definition of theft that
is mutually satisfactory.  I think, however, that the definition you
propose is not a good one, because from it it follows tautologically
that governments never commit theft, and that theft is subjective,
determined entirely by law.  It implies that if a government passed
a law allowing its officials to confiscate the property of any of
its citizens for any reason whatsoever, such confiscation would not
be theft.  I find this an unsatisfactory definition, though of course
you may differ.


> As to the philosophical question:  When such ordinary mortals as Kant and
> J.S. Mill justified taxation, they found it necessary and advisable to
> provide arguments in support of their assertions.  Libertarians, however,
> are above such requirements.  All that they have to do is to proclaim that
> "no one ever has the right, under any circumstances, to transfer wealth by
> forcible means or by threat of force," and the rest of us will have to bow
>  down to this proposition as a self-evident axiom.  

Ignoring the slight sarcasm and poetic rhetoric, I belive this statement
has an element of truth in it.  But Richard, consider the problem of political
discourse, and of reasoning in general.  When we reason, we must begin
from somewhere; no matter how far back we go, eventually we must stop
at primitive concepts which we cannot define, but which we hope are
understood by all parties with whom we wish to communicate.  This is a well
known deficiency of the axiomatic method of reasoning. Consider, for
example, a mathematician trying to explain the concept of infinity to
an extraterrestrial intelligence.

Mathematician: 
	"Consider a set with the following properties: ..."
Blancmange from the Planet Skyron in the Galaxy of Andromeda:
	"Wait a minute.  What's a set?"
M:
	"Why, its a collection of things."
BFTPSITGOA:
	"What's a collection?  What are things?"

	You can see the problem.  Any system of reasoning we attempt
to use will ultimately be founded upon axioms which we cannot "prove";
we simply accept them because we believe them to be true.  The non-
coercion principle is, for me, just such an axiom.  I cannot
"prove" its validity; I can only offer the following reasons why I
accept it.  Some of these may be the "rational statements" in support
of libertarian assertions that you seek:

	1)	There seems to be something special about human beings.
They can think, they have free will, they are born with natural control
over their thoughts, actions, bodies, etc.  
	2)	Consistency in thought and action is a desirable thing.
	3)	Justice ought to be as objective and verifiable as
possible.  It should be linked to lasting, fundamental concepts (i.e.
something less ephemeral than the will of the majority).
	4)	The non-coercion principle, when accepted as an axiom
of economics, leads to an intelligent, predicitive scientific discipline
that accurately explains how large numbers of freely acting people
distribute their resources (Austrian economics).  The high correlation
of Austrian economic theory with observed reality leads me to conclude
that it ought to be accepted as a science, (a distinction which I
would not confer on any other branch of economics), and to conclude that 
the NCP is an essential part of a healthy, prosperous society.
	5)	The NCP is extremely tolerant of people who do not accept it.  
If people believe that the non-coercion principle leads to injustice, they
posess great liberty in voluntary, non-coercive action to achieve what they feelis just.  Other distributive principles are not nearly so forgiving.
	6)	Freedom is inspiring; it inspires one to do good things.
It also produces an uncommon, almost indescribable feeling in those
who obtain it after previously not posessing it.  I interpret this
as evidence of its value and importance.

	I do not claim that the NCP falls out as a consequence of the
above; as I said, I accept the NCP as an axiom.  I simply offer the
above reasons (other libertarians doubtless have many others) for
accepting it as making a true statement about being a human being
on planet Earth.  

	I also note that people who come from Richard's perspective
are guilty of the same "crime" that he accuses libertarians of:
the assertion of axioms without supporting statements.  In his case,
equality is asserted as an axiom; something like "some sort of equality of
wealth is just and right".  I have yet to read an argument that attempts
to support this statement.  All egalitarian philosophers with which I
am familiar, from Marx to Rawls, imply or state right out that some kind
of equality of wealth is desirable and go from there.  It seems to me, however,
that there are numerous reasons for not accepting this equality principle (EP) 
as making a true statement about justice in the world we live in.  Two
of them are:

	1)	The EP is too vague to be a satisfactory foundation for
a theory of justice.
	2)	Human beings are not naturally endowed with equal talents
and abilities, and if left to themselves will realize unequal distributions 
of wealth.

	(Remember, these do not "disprove" the EP.  They are simply reasons 
why I do not believe it should be accepted as an axiom of philosophical 
discourse).
	There are numerous others, but this posting is too long-winded as it
is.  Perhaps another time.

--Barry
-- 
Barry Fagin @ University of California, Berkeley