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From: rwh@aesat.UUCP (Russ Herman)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Responses to D. Trissel and R. Herman
Message-ID: <343@aesat.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 12-Feb-85 21:42:46 EST
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Posted: Tue Feb 12 21:42:46 1985
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> > > One chooses...by evaluating alternatives.	[Paul Torek]
> > But discovering the alternatives can be a problem of perception, not of
> > reason. E.g., if the room was on fire, I couldn't find a way out without
> > my glasses! And I'm far from convinced that core values can be demonstrated
> > as being of rational origin.	[Russ Herman]
> But reason *includes* learning from experience (i.e. from perception) -- at
> least by my understanding of "reason".  And even though you may have trouble
> discovering alternatives you can still evaluate the ones you've discovered.
> (E.g., "I can stay here and burn or fumble around for the door or for my
> glasses; the door's easier to find ... [fumble,fumble]".)  And if reason
> includes learning from experience, core values are -- or rather *can be*
> -- of rational origin. [Paul Torek]

Have you ever known any clinical paranoids? They're *wonderful* at
reasoning. Only problem is that their perceptions are out to lunch.

How can you or I prove whether our core values are rational, or a product
of our social and familial conditioning? We certainly start from the
latter position. Then, how can we distinguish between being rational
and rationalizing?
-- 
  ______			Russ Herman
 /      \			{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!aesat!rwh
@( ?  ? )@			
 (  ||  )			The opinions above are strictly personal, and 
 ( \__/ )			do not reflect those of my employer (or even
  \____/			possibly myself an hour from now.)