Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site aesat.UUCP Path: utzoo!aesat!rwh From: rwh@aesat.UUCP (Russ Herman) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: Responses to D. Trissel and R. Herman Message-ID: <343@aesat.UUCP> Date: Tue, 12-Feb-85 21:42:46 EST Article-I.D.: aesat.343 Posted: Tue Feb 12 21:42:46 1985 Date-Received: Tue, 12-Feb-85 21:51:10 EST References: <747@wucs.UUCP> Organization: AES Data Inc., Mississauga, Ont., CANADA L5N 3C9 Lines: 27 > > > One chooses...by evaluating alternatives. [Paul Torek] > > But discovering the alternatives can be a problem of perception, not of > > reason. E.g., if the room was on fire, I couldn't find a way out without > > my glasses! And I'm far from convinced that core values can be demonstrated > > as being of rational origin. [Russ Herman] > But reason *includes* learning from experience (i.e. from perception) -- at > least by my understanding of "reason". And even though you may have trouble > discovering alternatives you can still evaluate the ones you've discovered. > (E.g., "I can stay here and burn or fumble around for the door or for my > glasses; the door's easier to find ... [fumble,fumble]".) And if reason > includes learning from experience, core values are -- or rather *can be* > -- of rational origin. [Paul Torek] Have you ever known any clinical paranoids? They're *wonderful* at reasoning. Only problem is that their perceptions are out to lunch. How can you or I prove whether our core values are rational, or a product of our social and familial conditioning? We certainly start from the latter position. Then, how can we distinguish between being rational and rationalizing? -- ______ Russ Herman / \ {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!aesat!rwh @( ? ? )@ ( || ) The opinions above are strictly personal, and ( \__/ ) do not reflect those of my employer (or even \____/ possibly myself an hour from now.)