Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 8/7/84; site ucbvax.ARPA Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!ihnp4!ucbvax!fagin From: fagin@ucbvax.ARPA (Barry Steven Fagin) Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Taking up Richard's gauntlet ... Message-ID: <4715@ucbvax.ARPA> Date: Sun, 10-Feb-85 15:16:21 EST Article-I.D.: ucbvax.4715 Posted: Sun Feb 10 15:16:21 1985 Date-Received: Mon, 11-Feb-85 06:49:45 EST References: <326@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP> Reply-To: fagin@ucbvax.UUCP (Barry Steven Fagin) Followup-To: net.politics.theory Organization: University of California at Berkeley Lines: 126 Summary: Richard Carnes would prefer libertarians to be more philosophically precise. Here is my humble attempt: (regarding the definition of theft) > Please refer to your favorite dictionary. Therein you will find that theft > is by definition "felonious," i.e., unlawful. Taxation is by definition > enforced by law. Whether "taxation is theft" is merely a matter of > *definition* and is not in itself a question of political philosophy. Definitions are crucial in philosophy, indeed in reasoning in general. They're the starting point for all productive philosophical discussion. Whether or not taxation is theft is indeed a matter of definition, PROVIDED we accept your definition of theft. Consider, however, another definition: "Theft: the taking of justly obtained property from one or more persons by one or more persons, in an unjust manner". This definition seems to me to be much more interesting, since it contains the words "just" and "unjust" in it. If we accept this definition of theft, then whether or not taxation is theft becomes a question of political philosophy, since in order to answer the question we have to deal with justice and injustice. I think this is a good definition of theft, but if you refuse to accept it then it would be foolish for us to proceed further until we have arrived at a definition of theft that is mutually satisfactory. I think, however, that the definition you propose is not a good one, because from it it follows tautologically that governments never commit theft, and that theft is subjective, determined entirely by law. It implies that if a government passed a law allowing its officials to confiscate the property of any of its citizens for any reason whatsoever, such confiscation would not be theft. I find this an unsatisfactory definition, though of course you may differ. > As to the philosophical question: When such ordinary mortals as Kant and > J.S. Mill justified taxation, they found it necessary and advisable to > provide arguments in support of their assertions. Libertarians, however, > are above such requirements. All that they have to do is to proclaim that > "no one ever has the right, under any circumstances, to transfer wealth by > forcible means or by threat of force," and the rest of us will have to bow > down to this proposition as a self-evident axiom. Ignoring the slight sarcasm and poetic rhetoric, I belive this statement has an element of truth in it. But Richard, consider the problem of political discourse, and of reasoning in general. When we reason, we must begin from somewhere; no matter how far back we go, eventually we must stop at primitive concepts which we cannot define, but which we hope are understood by all parties with whom we wish to communicate. This is a well known deficiency of the axiomatic method of reasoning. Consider, for example, a mathematician trying to explain the concept of infinity to an extraterrestrial intelligence. Mathematician: "Consider a set with the following properties: ..." Blancmange from the Planet Skyron in the Galaxy of Andromeda: "Wait a minute. What's a set?" M: "Why, its a collection of things." BFTPSITGOA: "What's a collection? What are things?" You can see the problem. Any system of reasoning we attempt to use will ultimately be founded upon axioms which we cannot "prove"; we simply accept them because we believe them to be true. The non- coercion principle is, for me, just such an axiom. I cannot "prove" its validity; I can only offer the following reasons why I accept it. Some of these may be the "rational statements" in support of libertarian assertions that you seek: 1) There seems to be something special about human beings. They can think, they have free will, they are born with natural control over their thoughts, actions, bodies, etc. 2) Consistency in thought and action is a desirable thing. 3) Justice ought to be as objective and verifiable as possible. It should be linked to lasting, fundamental concepts (i.e. something less ephemeral than the will of the majority). 4) The non-coercion principle, when accepted as an axiom of economics, leads to an intelligent, predicitive scientific discipline that accurately explains how large numbers of freely acting people distribute their resources (Austrian economics). The high correlation of Austrian economic theory with observed reality leads me to conclude that it ought to be accepted as a science, (a distinction which I would not confer on any other branch of economics), and to conclude that the NCP is an essential part of a healthy, prosperous society. 5) The NCP is extremely tolerant of people who do not accept it. If people believe that the non-coercion principle leads to injustice, they posess great liberty in voluntary, non-coercive action to achieve what they feelis just. Other distributive principles are not nearly so forgiving. 6) Freedom is inspiring; it inspires one to do good things. It also produces an uncommon, almost indescribable feeling in those who obtain it after previously not posessing it. I interpret this as evidence of its value and importance. I do not claim that the NCP falls out as a consequence of the above; as I said, I accept the NCP as an axiom. I simply offer the above reasons (other libertarians doubtless have many others) for accepting it as making a true statement about being a human being on planet Earth. I also note that people who come from Richard's perspective are guilty of the same "crime" that he accuses libertarians of: the assertion of axioms without supporting statements. In his case, equality is asserted as an axiom; something like "some sort of equality of wealth is just and right". I have yet to read an argument that attempts to support this statement. All egalitarian philosophers with which I am familiar, from Marx to Rawls, imply or state right out that some kind of equality of wealth is desirable and go from there. It seems to me, however, that there are numerous reasons for not accepting this equality principle (EP) as making a true statement about justice in the world we live in. Two of them are: 1) The EP is too vague to be a satisfactory foundation for a theory of justice. 2) Human beings are not naturally endowed with equal talents and abilities, and if left to themselves will realize unequal distributions of wealth. (Remember, these do not "disprove" the EP. They are simply reasons why I do not believe it should be accepted as an axiom of philosophical discourse). There are numerous others, but this posting is too long-winded as it is. Perhaps another time. --Barry -- Barry Fagin @ University of California, Berkeley