Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP Path: utzoo!decvax!linus!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!umcp-cs!flink From: flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul Torek) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: More on free will Message-ID: <8139@umcp-cs.UUCP> Date: Tue, 21-Aug-84 23:30:46 EDT Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.8139 Posted: Tue Aug 21 23:30:46 1984 Date-Received: Thu, 23-Aug-84 03:18:29 EDT Distribution: na Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD Lines: 27 Jim Balter says: You have to decide what you *mean* by free will before you can reasonably argue about whether or not we have it. So far, so good. But he also says: By my definition, I have free will if neither you nor I can predict my actions. That definition stinks. It tells us what free will is (allegedly) not, rather than what it is. Definition by exclusion is a flawed procedure (except for words which are negations: un---, in---, a---, etc.). Not only that, but the exclusion is invalid: you may have free will even though both of us can predict your actions. [I assume that Balter means his if as an if-and-only-if.] If both you and I can predict that you will do A at time t, and you rationally judge that doing A at t is best, and you act on this judgement at t, then your doing A is free. In an argument against a libertarian, Balter points out that "You are a product of your environment. ... You are not a self-made person." This way of putting it shows a flaw with another popular definition-by-exclusion of freedom. Many people think that determinism is incompatible with freedom. Not so. Freedom does not require being a self-*made* person; it requires being a self-*making* person, at least with respect to one's actions. And it is sufficient for being "self-making" that one is able to evaluate the kind of actions one performs and to change oneself accordingly. --The aspiring iconoclast, Paul Torek, umcp-cs!flink