Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site dartvax.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!dartvax!karl From: karl@dartvax.UUCP (S. Delage.) Newsgroups: net.sf-lovers Subject: U-Haul from the Milky Way to Andromeda. Message-ID: <2272@dartvax.UUCP> Date: Sat, 4-Aug-84 20:53:06 EDT Article-I.D.: dartvax.2272 Posted: Sat Aug 4 20:53:06 1984 Date-Received: Sun, 5-Aug-84 08:28:19 EDT Distribution: net.philosophy Organization: Dartmouth College Lines: 27 Mr. Perlberg writes ``Producing a duplicate of oneself whenever one dies is not really immortality any more than having a child.'' Doesn't this depend on the notion we take of selfhood? As Mr. Perlberg points out, it seems likely such a duplicate would behave exactly the same in all situations as I would, given that it is starting from the same point, with the same memory impressions. But doesn't that make it another ``I''? Isn't the only way to tell people apart from their behavior? For all practical purposes, it would seem to be the same person. And yet, this appears to be intuitively wrong. I suppose we'll have to wait until someone develops a matter transmitter, then we can experiment. Mr. Perlberg also points out such a transmiiter would take a long time to develop to perfection. Almost surely true, but what's the difference between imagining the changes 5,000 years from now, or 10,000? Also, one hopes that with such technical expertise, the problem Jeannie faced of creatng droughts by making it rain and the like would also be better understood, and thus avoided. Such a future would be very interesting. ``May you live in interesting times.'' dartvax!karl karl@dartmouth