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From: flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul Torek)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: More on free will
Message-ID: <8139@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 21-Aug-84 23:30:46 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.8139
Posted: Tue Aug 21 23:30:46 1984
Date-Received: Thu, 23-Aug-84 03:18:29 EDT
Distribution: na
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 27

Jim Balter says:
 	You have to decide what you *mean* by free will before you can
	reasonably argue about whether or not we have it.
So far, so good.  But he also says:
	By my definition, I have free will if neither you nor I can
	predict my actions.

That definition stinks.  It tells us what free will is (allegedly) not,
rather than what it is.  Definition by exclusion is a flawed procedure
(except for words which are negations:  un---, in---, a---, etc.).  Not only
that, but the exclusion is invalid:  you may have free will even though both
of us can predict your actions.  [I assume that Balter means his if as an
if-and-only-if.]  If both you and I can predict that you will do A at time
t, and you rationally judge that doing A at t is best, and you act on this
judgement at t, then your doing A is free.

In an argument against a libertarian, Balter points out that "You are a
product of your environment. ... You are not a self-made person."  This way
of putting it shows a flaw with another popular definition-by-exclusion of
freedom.  Many people think that determinism is incompatible with freedom.
Not so.  Freedom does not require being a self-*made* person; it requires
being a self-*making* person, at least with respect to one's actions.  And
it is sufficient for being "self-making" that one is able to evaluate the
kind of actions one performs and to change oneself accordingly.

				--The aspiring iconoclast,
				Paul Torek, umcp-cs!flink