Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site fisher.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!allegra!princeton!astrovax!fisher!david From: david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: A Sketch of Arms Control Agreements (long) Message-ID: <264@fisher.UUCP> Date: Sat, 11-Aug-84 10:52:40 EDT Article-I.D.: fisher.264 Posted: Sat Aug 11 10:52:40 1984 Date-Received: Sun, 12-Aug-84 01:16:06 EDT References: <457@tty3b.UUCP>, <794@ihuxb.UUCP>, <1012@ihuxi.UUCP> <462@tty3b.UUCP> Organization: Princeton Univ. Statistics Lines: 58 The point of any nuclear arms program is credible deterrence. The Reagan administration has shown a willingness to advocate arms systems which will not deter, but rather encourage both sides to more strongly consider a first strike. Chief among these is the MX. To understand what the MX will do to deterrence, one must first understand how MIRVing has destabilized the nuclear balance. Suppose each side has an equal number of launchers, each with with one warhead, in a world with no ABM's. Then there is no conceivable way for either side to begin a first strike without being subject to a devastating response, and nuclear strikes are strongly deterred. However, if one now supposes both sides have approximately the same number of launchers, and each launcher has TEN warheads, each side will be sorely tempted to target five warheads on EACH of the other's launchers, and may realistically hope to destroy virtually all of the opponent's nuclear forces while using only 50% of their own. A clear advantage belongs to the power which strikes first, thus destabilizing the balance of terror. Now, the ideal solution would be to ban MIRVing, but this is no longer possible, as neither side appears interested in negotiations. The next best solution is to have the sites of the launchers unknown, as then a first strike becomes impossible. This is why SLBM's are so effective, and this is what the Carter administration was seeking to do with its proposals for a "shell game" form of MX basing. The Reagan administration is satisfied to base the MX in fixed siloes, thus going a long way toward establishing incentives for both the US and the USSR to strike first (this Prisoner's Dilemma (cf. Game Theory) is commonly referred to by the phrase "use 'em or lose 'em). Another way in which Reagan defense policy is undermining deterrence is its exploration of "Star Wars" systems. This is just a new version of the ABM, with all its attendant problems. By introducing a "defense" against nuclear attack, the potential for miscalculation is increased umpteenfold, as decision makers will have to rely on the bureaucracy's estimate of its efficiency in formulating optimum policy, and as that estimate is bound to be inaccurate on either the Soviet's or our part, the perceived optimum policy may not be the actual optimum, and the result could be war. It is important that in the game of deterrence both US and USSR leaders play the same game, that is, hold the same perceptions as to each other's abilities. As Mike Kelly pointed out, the number of warheads is not too important. Deterrence is based upon the perceived capability to carry out a RETALIATORY strike, and thus the type and basing of warheads is more important than the number of them. The role of treaty agreements is as much to channel arms production into stable types and modes as well as to reduce the total number of them, and cannot be judged only by the latter standard. In fact, large numbers of warheads are preferable to having very few. What could be worse than your opponent having ONE more warhead than you, if they have one and you have none? On the other hand, if they have 100,000, but you only have 10,000, and your meager 10,000 is secure from a first strike, you are very secure indeed. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david