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From: gam@proper.UUCP (Gordon Moffett)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: No mirror, no dust
Message-ID: <1471@proper.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 29-Jul-84 16:36:57 EDT
Article-I.D.: proper.1471
Posted: Sun Jul 29 16:36:57 1984
Date-Received: Mon, 30-Jul-84 01:35:47 EDT
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Organization: Proper UNIX, Oakland, CA
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> From: dsaker@iuvax.UUCP (Daryel Akerlind, ...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker)
> 
> Could those denying the existence of mind please give an account of
> mental experience?

If I am denying the existence of `mind' then why should I define what
I assert is not there?

> I am in a laboratory, looking at a red square.  The scientists around me
> determine the frequency of the light entering my eye, exciting the rods and
> cones in my retina.  Other scientists trace the firings of my neurons  (yes,
> my shaved head looks like a pin cushion)  and observe how the electro-
> chemical messages make their way from my retina to various parts of my brain,
> interact with the general activity their, and so on and so on.
> But all of that neuronal activity is distinct from my experience of seeing
> the red square.

Let us say that neurological activity is the domain on neurologists;
I am talking about behavior, and I need no `mind' (or neurons, for that
matter) to explain behavior.

> You can say that the brain/body states cause the mental experience, but the
> mental experience is not the same thing as those brain/body states.

No argument.  The mental experience does not exist.

> Saying that "neuron so-&-so in my brain is firing at rate such-&-such" is
> not the same thing as saying "I see red".  The two are perhaps connected,
> but they are not equivalent.

That is correct.  Saying, "I see red", is a verbal behavior, typically
associated with the speaker observing the color red in their visual
field, or metaphorically describing a state of anger.  Other associations
occur but are rare.  (And, still, there is no need for a `mind' here,
either).

> Now, my mental experiences have to do with my mind.  This question of
> "mind" is subtle, and I would like to establish the situation with respect
> to mental experiences before dealing with mind.

Perhaps it is subtle because it is so ill-defined (which we seem to
agree on).  But the burden of proof on the existence or definition
of mind is on the mentalists, not the behaviorists.  I am happy to
simply refute the need for mentalist explanations of behavior.
-- 

Gordon A. Moffett

{ hplabs!nsc, decvax!sun!amd, ihnp4!dual } !proper!gam