Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site proper.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxl!ihnp4!zehntel!dual!proper!gam From: gam@proper.UUCP (Gordon Moffett) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: No mirror, no dust Message-ID: <1471@proper.UUCP> Date: Sun, 29-Jul-84 16:36:57 EDT Article-I.D.: proper.1471 Posted: Sun Jul 29 16:36:57 1984 Date-Received: Mon, 30-Jul-84 01:35:47 EDT References: <561@flairvax.UUCP>, <1600002@iuvax.UUCP> Organization: Proper UNIX, Oakland, CA Lines: 49 > From: dsaker@iuvax.UUCP (Daryel Akerlind, ...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker) > > Could those denying the existence of mind please give an account of > mental experience? If I am denying the existence of `mind' then why should I define what I assert is not there? > I am in a laboratory, looking at a red square. The scientists around me > determine the frequency of the light entering my eye, exciting the rods and > cones in my retina. Other scientists trace the firings of my neurons (yes, > my shaved head looks like a pin cushion) and observe how the electro- > chemical messages make their way from my retina to various parts of my brain, > interact with the general activity their, and so on and so on. > But all of that neuronal activity is distinct from my experience of seeing > the red square. Let us say that neurological activity is the domain on neurologists; I am talking about behavior, and I need no `mind' (or neurons, for that matter) to explain behavior. > You can say that the brain/body states cause the mental experience, but the > mental experience is not the same thing as those brain/body states. No argument. The mental experience does not exist. > Saying that "neuron so-&-so in my brain is firing at rate such-&-such" is > not the same thing as saying "I see red". The two are perhaps connected, > but they are not equivalent. That is correct. Saying, "I see red", is a verbal behavior, typically associated with the speaker observing the color red in their visual field, or metaphorically describing a state of anger. Other associations occur but are rare. (And, still, there is no need for a `mind' here, either). > Now, my mental experiences have to do with my mind. This question of > "mind" is subtle, and I would like to establish the situation with respect > to mental experiences before dealing with mind. Perhaps it is subtle because it is so ill-defined (which we seem to agree on). But the burden of proof on the existence or definition of mind is on the mentalists, not the behaviorists. I am happy to simply refute the need for mentalist explanations of behavior. -- Gordon A. Moffett { hplabs!nsc, decvax!sun!amd, ihnp4!dual } !proper!gam