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From: david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: A Sketch of Arms Control Agreements (long)
Message-ID: <264@fisher.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 11-Aug-84 10:52:40 EDT
Article-I.D.: fisher.264
Posted: Sat Aug 11 10:52:40 1984
Date-Received: Sun, 12-Aug-84 01:16:06 EDT
References: <457@tty3b.UUCP>, <794@ihuxb.UUCP>, <1012@ihuxi.UUCP> <462@tty3b.UUCP>
Organization: Princeton Univ. Statistics
Lines: 58

The point of any nuclear arms program is credible deterrence. The
Reagan administration has shown a willingness to advocate arms systems
which will not deter, but rather encourage both sides to more strongly
consider a first strike. Chief among these is the MX.

To understand what the MX will do to deterrence, one must first
understand how MIRVing has destabilized the nuclear balance. Suppose
each side has an equal number of launchers, each with with one
warhead, in a world with no ABM's. Then there is no conceivable way for
either side to begin a first strike without being subject to a 
devastating response, and nuclear strikes are strongly deterred. 

However, if one now supposes both sides have approximately the same
number of launchers, and each launcher has TEN warheads, each side will
be sorely tempted to target five warheads on EACH of the other's
launchers, and may realistically hope to destroy virtually all of the
opponent's nuclear forces while using only 50% of their own. A clear
advantage belongs to the power which strikes first, thus destabilizing
the balance of terror.

Now, the ideal solution would be to ban MIRVing, but this is no longer
possible, as neither side appears interested in negotiations. The next
best solution is to have the sites of the launchers unknown, as then a
first strike becomes impossible. This is why SLBM's are so effective,
and this is what the Carter administration was seeking to do with its
proposals for a "shell game" form of MX basing. The Reagan
administration is satisfied to base the MX in fixed siloes, thus going
a long way toward establishing incentives for both the US and the USSR
to strike first (this Prisoner's Dilemma (cf. Game Theory) is commonly
referred to by the phrase "use 'em or lose 'em).

Another way in which Reagan defense policy is undermining deterrence
is its exploration of "Star Wars" systems. This is just a new version
of the ABM, with all its attendant problems. By introducing a
"defense" against nuclear attack, the potential for miscalculation is
increased umpteenfold, as decision makers will have to rely on the 
bureaucracy's estimate of its efficiency in formulating optimum
policy, and as that estimate is bound to be inaccurate on either the
Soviet's or our part, the perceived optimum policy may not be the
actual optimum, and the result could be war. It is important that in
the game of deterrence both US and USSR leaders play the same game,
that is, hold the same perceptions as to each other's abilities.

As Mike Kelly pointed out, the number of warheads is not too
important. Deterrence is based upon the perceived capability to carry
out a RETALIATORY strike, and thus the type and basing of warheads is
more important than the number of them. The role of treaty agreements
is as much to channel arms production into stable types and modes as
well as to reduce the total number of them, and cannot be judged only
by the latter standard. In fact, large numbers of warheads are
preferable to having very few. What could be worse than your opponent
having ONE more warhead than you, if they have one and you have none?
On the other hand, if they have 100,000, but you only have 10,000, and
your meager 10,000 is secure from a first strike, you are very secure
indeed.

					David Rubin
			{allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david