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Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!dartvax!karl
From: karl@dartvax.UUCP (S. Delage.)
Newsgroups: net.sf-lovers
Subject: U-Haul from the Milky Way to Andromeda.
Message-ID: <2272@dartvax.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 4-Aug-84 20:53:06 EDT
Article-I.D.: dartvax.2272
Posted: Sat Aug  4 20:53:06 1984
Date-Received: Sun, 5-Aug-84 08:28:19 EDT
Distribution: net.philosophy
Organization: Dartmouth College
Lines: 27

Mr. Perlberg writes ``Producing a duplicate of oneself whenever
one dies is not really immortality any more than having a child.''
Doesn't this depend on the notion we take of selfhood? As Mr.
Perlberg points out, it seems likely such a duplicate would behave
exactly the same in all situations as I would, given that it is starting from
the same point, with the same memory impressions. But doesn't that
make it another ``I''?
   Isn't the only way to tell people apart from their behavior?
For all practical purposes, it would seem to be the same person.
And yet, this appears to be intuitively wrong. I suppose we'll
have to wait until someone develops a matter transmitter, then
we can experiment.

Mr. Perlberg also points out such a transmiiter would take a long
time to develop to perfection. Almost surely true, but what's the
difference between imagining the changes 5,000 years from now, or
10,000? Also, one hopes that with such technical expertise, the
problem Jeannie faced of creatng droughts by making it rain and
the like would also be better understood, and thus avoided.
Such a future would be very interesting. ``May you live in
interesting times.''

dartvax!karl                   karl@dartmouth