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From: bch@unc.UUCP (Byron Howes )
Newsgroups: net.misc,net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Can Creationists Contribute to Science?
Message-ID: <6703@unc.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 5-Feb-84 23:05:20 EST
Article-I.D.: unc.6703
Posted: Sun Feb  5 23:05:20 1984
Date-Received: Thu, 9-Feb-84 03:53:01 EST
References: <791@qubix.UUCP>, <649@dciem.UUCP>, <1577@cbscc.UUCP>
Organization: University of North Carolina Comp. Center
Lines: 52

>>I do not think that Larry Bickford's discription of "compact intervention"
>>to be "impossible to work with".  I don't think it would invalidate much
>>of the scientific knowledege we have about the way things work today.  Nor
>>do I think that scientific inquiry into the past would be rendered useless.
>>Sure, a creator could have fooled us into thinking that we actually have a
>>past, but why is it necessary to make that assumption?

Unless you are willing to lay down a set of rules for Deific intervention,
that is make the Deity a non-random theoretical factor, the notion of
intervention "compact" or otherwise, effectively trashes science as it
has been conducted in the past and as it is conducted today.  If we 
assert that "a miracle" has been the cause of some event, then we must
allow for "miracles" involved in, or at the heart of other events, or all
events.  If, in fact, we have a capricious Deity running around changing
things as we look at them then the verifiable experiment of today may
be unreproducable tomorrow.  Is this any way to run a universe?

>>The problem I think that most people would have with this "compact
>>intervention" idea is that it allows that there might be some things
>>that are beyond our ability to know or discover.  But is this a good argument
>>against it?  Why should accepting the possibility that we may not be able
>>to know something hinder us from trying?

Most scientists accept the notion that there are things that they may not
be able to know *in their lifetime* so in a sense it is not too difficult
to make the step that there may be things that will never be known.  
However, how can we tell the difference between a research path which will
bear fruitful scientific results and one which will dead-end at a miracle.
How do we know a miracle when we come to it?  Actually, Paul, you make
a good case for adhering to evolutionist theory here.  Even if I assume
that the creationist argument is correct, I must continue to pursue the
evolutionist argument so as not to allow the possibility of a miracle to
hinder my research.  

>>Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this compact intervention idea is
>>actually correct.  Should we then still prefer our naturalistic explainations
>>because those are the ones we can grasp?  Isn't this like prefering to look
>>in the kitchen for the nickel we lost in the basement because there's light
>>in the kitchen?

Indeed we should.  Your analogy is a little off base since (a) we don't
know we lost the nickle in the basement and (b) we're not sure its a
nickle we're looking for or a dime, or possibly a tube of toothpaste.
It makes sense to begin in the kitchen and work our way down to the basement
after we've checked the kitchen out.  Then, again, maybe its an elephant
in the living room we're looking for.  You get the idea.

-- 

					Byron Howes
					UNC - Chapel Hill
					(decvax!mcnc!unc!bch)