Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site cbscc.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!security!genrad!grkermit!masscomp!clyde!floyd!whuxle!pyuxll!abnjh!u1100a!pyuxn!pyuxww!mhuxm!mhuxl!cbosgd!cbscc!pmd From: pmd@cbscc.UUCP Newsgroups: net.misc Subject: Re: Can Creationists Contribute to Science? Message-ID: <1577@cbscc.UUCP> Date: Sat, 28-Jan-84 21:26:08 EST Article-I.D.: cbscc.1577 Posted: Sat Jan 28 21:26:08 1984 Date-Received: Wed, 1-Feb-84 01:21:12 EST References: <791@qubix.UUCP>, <649@dciem.UUCP> Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Columbus Lines: 21 I do not think that Larry Bickford's discription of "compact intervention" to be "impossible to work with". I don't think it would invalidate much of the scientific knowledege we have about the way things work today. Nor do I think that scientific inquiry into the past would be rendered useless. Sure, a creator could have fooled us into thinking that we actually have a past, but why is it necessary to make that assumption? The problem I think that most people would have with this "compact intervention" idea is that it allows that there might be some things that are beyond our ability to know or discover. But is this a good argument against it? Why should accepting the possibility that we may not be able to know something hinder us from trying? Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this compact intervention idea is actually correct. Should we then still prefer our naturalistic explainations because those are the ones we can grasp? Isn't this like prefering to look in the kitchen for the nickel we lost in the basement because there's light in the kitchen? Paul Dubuc