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From: pmd@cbscc.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.misc
Subject: Re: Can Creationists Contribute to Science?
Message-ID: <1577@cbscc.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 28-Jan-84 21:26:08 EST
Article-I.D.: cbscc.1577
Posted: Sat Jan 28 21:26:08 1984
Date-Received: Wed, 1-Feb-84 01:21:12 EST
References: <791@qubix.UUCP>, <649@dciem.UUCP>
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories , Columbus
Lines: 21


I do not think that Larry Bickford's discription of "compact intervention"
to be "impossible to work with".  I don't think it would invalidate much
of the scientific knowledege we have about the way things work today.  Nor
do I think that scientific inquiry into the past would be rendered useless.
Sure, a creator could have fooled us into thinking that we actually have a
past, but why is it necessary to make that assumption?

The problem I think that most people would have with this "compact
intervention" idea is that it allows that there might be some things
that are beyond our ability to know or discover.  But is this a good argument
against it?  Why should accepting the possibility that we may not be able
to know something hinder us from trying?

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this compact intervention idea is
actually correct.  Should we then still prefer our naturalistic explainations
because those are the ones we can grasp?  Isn't this like prefering to look
in the kitchen for the nickel we lost in the basement because there's light
in the kitchen?

Paul Dubuc