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From: pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc)
Newsgroups: net.misc
Subject: Re: More on Creationism
Message-ID: <1636@cbscc.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 3-Feb-84 13:41:23 EST
Article-I.D.: cbscc.1636
Posted: Fri Feb  3 13:41:23 1984
Date-Received: Wed, 8-Feb-84 07:49:41 EST
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Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories , Columbus
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In response to John Hobson's following comments:

    More on the Second Law of Thermodynamics.  I just looked up
    Morris' definition of the second law, and it is as follows: 

	The second law of thermodynamics is the law of increasing
	entropy, stating that all real processes tend to go towards
	a state of higher probability, which means greater disorder.
	This applies to all known systems, both physical and
	biological, a fact which is universally accepted by
	scientists in every field.
		--Morris, The Troubled Waters of Evolution, p. 98.

    In this quotations, the words "closed system" are not mentioned. 
    Morris goes on to say that the rejoinder that the earth is not a
    closed system is "an extremely naive argument" (p. 123).  He says
    that: 
	Obviously growth cannot occur in a closed system; the Second
	Law is in fact *defined* in terms of a closed system. 
	However, this criterion is really redundant, because in the
	real world closed systems do not even exist!  It is obvious
	that the Laws of Thermodynamics apply to open systems as
	well, since they have only been tested and proved on open
	systems!
		--ibid, p. 125. (Italics in original.)

    How fortunate we are to have Dr. Morris to set us straight.
    
    The concept of thermodynamically closed system, like that of a
    frictionless plane or a rigid body, is an idealization.  The laws of
    thermodynamics, like the ideal gas laws, can be tested and confirmed
    (*not* proved) by investigating systems that are only approximately
    closed.  What we cannot do is to apply these laws to systems in
    which the energy flow across the boundries is significant with
    respect to the energy transactions within these boundries.  That
    would be like using rigid body mechanics to examine the motion of
    blobs of Jell-o.  Saying that "Open, closed, what's the difference?"
    displays a hopeless misunderstanding of the laws of thermodynamics
    and a remarkable ignorance of the uses of idealization in physics.
    
    A second answer of Morris, which lies at the heart of Miller's
    response, is what I shall call the "evolving junkyard" argument:
    
	It should be self-evident that the mere existence of an open
	system of some kind, with access to the sun's energy, does
	not of itself generate growth.  The sun's energy may bathe
	the site of an automobile junk yard for a million years, but
	it will never cause the rusted, broken parts to grow
	together into a functioning automobile.  A beaker containing
	a fluid mixture of hydrochloric, water, salt, or any other
	combination of chemicals, may lie exposed to the sun for
	endless years, but the chemicals will never combine into a 
	living bacterium or any other self-replicating organism. 
	More likely, it would destroy any organism which might
	accidently have been caught in it.  Availability of energy
	(by the First Law of Thermodynamics) has in itself no
	mechanism for thwarting the basic decay principle enunciated
	by the Second Law of Thermodynamics.  *Quantity* of energy is
	not the question, but *quality*.
		--ibid., p. 123.  (Italics in original.)

    This might look like a clever objection, but the issue has been
    shifted.  Evolutionary theory was originally challenged to reconcile
    its claims of increasing organization and complexity with the Second
    Law of Thermodynamics.  The challenge is met by saying that the
    Second Law does not apply in this case since the earth is not a good
    approximation to a closed system.  The creationists now ask why some
    open systems show decreasing entropy and others (cars in junkyards)
    do not.  The simple answer is that this is an "apples and oranges"
    comparison.  A more detailed answer would be to explain just how
    both living things and automobiles change.  No one alleges that
    having an open system is sufficient for decreased entropy. 
    Evolutionary theory says that decreased entropy is possible in an
    open system, not that it is necessary in any open system.
    
    This is an interesting example since, if you look at it, Morris
    begins by misstating the Second Law.  Then, he considers a response
    that does not correct the formulation.  This makes it look like the
    evolutionists have fallen back on closed systems as a desperate
    ploy.  He continues by distorting the role of idealization in
    science, and ends by changing the question.
    
My first objection to this argument is technical and maybe nit-picky.
John presents these arguments as if they were a result of his own
research when in fact the above is lifted nearly verbatim (including
the quotations of Morris) from Philip Kitcher's book "Abusing Science"
(see pp. 89-95).  I have no objection to Kitcher's arguments being
presented, but I think that John should give credit where credit is due.
Doing this does not support his claim to having read creationist books
extensively.  I believe that he has read some, because of a personal
conversation that I had with him.  But here I am tempted to believe that
his view of creationism is largley a product of anti-creationist writing
and not of an objective reading of both creationist and anti-creationist.


Moving away from that, I found that Kitcher, in his haggling over the
proper definition of the laws of thermodynamics, does not really solve
the problem of why entropy law does not present a problem for evolution.
In particular Kitcher never once deals with Morris' objections to Stanley
Miller's experiments with abiogenesis (his famous amino acid soup).  Kitcher
is right in pointing out that the evolving junk yard analogy is not a
good one.  But all he says is that DNA is different material than a junkyard.
(pp. 94-95). In the previous section, "The Randomness Ploy", Kitcher 
involves the reader in a semantic argument, maintaining that creationists
insist evolution depends on *irreducible randomness* (like a tornado in
a junkyard) when it does not.  I find it interesting that, in all his
research, Kitcher never bothers with Coppedge's book "Evolution: Possible
or Impossible", especially since Morris cites Coppedge's work in "Scientific
Creationism".  Also Kitcher confuses the issue by applying the creationist
"randomness" argument exclusively to genetic mutation, and not abiogenesis,
to which it mainly applies.  For evolutionists to settle this issue
I would like to see a sound refutation to the article "The Probability of
Life from Non-Life", by Terry Brown, which I posted a week ago.

Also, I would like to take issue with some of the examples of entropy decrease
cited by evolutioists.

The first one is the formation of snowflakes.  They are definitely of a
more complex structure than the water vapor of which they are formed.
But how does this example support evolution?  The molecular structure
has not changed (it's still H2O), only the arrangement of molecules.
Also the energy vector is in the wrong direction.  Supposed evolutionary
processes depend on energy being added to the system not subtracted from
it.

A second example was cited by an evolutionist in a recent local debate
with Duane Gish.  That is the "burning" of hydrogen atoms in a star or
atom bomb produces heavier, more complex elements.  Yet this also does
not seem to lend much support for abiogenesis.  Elements (atoms) are
not molecules.  One must wonder how stable these products of an atomic
reaction are, and I don't think any biologist would suggest that the
first life forms came about as the byproduct of such a reaction.
It seems to me that if you generate enough heat to break an atom apart
it's no wonder that the parts will soon combine again into a stable
atom of some element.  The same cannot be said of organic molecules.
I think the "apples and oranges" objection can definitely be applied here.


In closing this note I would like to say that I found many more serious
problems with Kitcher's attack on creationism.  Time doesn't permit me
to go into any more of them.  This whole origins debate is getting very
boring in light of the fact that I have a new, 1 1/2 day old daughter
to take care of.  Loving this little darling is bound to take up a lot
of my time in the near future.  ... and I'm going to love every minute
of it.

Regards,

Paul Dubuc